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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are enjoying the tranquility of your home and its sur-
roundings when you receive a notice in the mail that the local power
company wants to condemn your home in order to build a new power
plant.1 Determined to put up a fight in hopes of the power company
backing down, you decide to contest the taking in court. During trial, the
power company adduces a few drawings of the proposed power plant,
along with financial reports showing that the power company will likely
be able to complete the project in the coming years. Surely, you think,
the power company must produce something other than a few drawings
and reports before it can condemn your property. However, the court
rules in favor of the power company, and you are forced to leave your
home.
Six months later, you read about a major real estate development
plan in the newspaper involving new housing subdivisions and strip
malls. As you read the article more carefully, you realize the proposed
site of this new development is exactly where your old house used to
stand, before the power company demolished it. Furious, you call your
lawyer and demand he file a complaint to get your property back, as the
power company appeared to have no intention of building a power plant
tJ.D. Candidate, Seattle University School of Law, 2007; B.A., Political Science, Western Washing-
ton University, 2003. 1 would like to thank Richard and Debbie Boe for providing me with the idea
for this article, my friends and family for their unwavering support throughout law school, and
members of the Seattle University Law Review for their thoughtful feedback throughout the editing
process.
1. This hypothetical is based on a pending case, O 'Neal v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co.
Class Action, Wrongful Taking of Real and Personal Property, Demand for Jury Trial, O'Neal v.
Indianapolis Power & Light Co., NO. 55DOI-0409-PL-561 (Ind. Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 2004), available
at http://richardnboe.com/classaction.htm.
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in the first place. Giving up your home for a project that benefits every-
one is tolerable, but losing your home so others can make a profit is un-
acceptable, you tell him. Sadly, your attorney informs you that you have
no cause of action against the power company. Because the court deter-
mined that the taking was for a "public use," the power company can do
whatever it wants with the property. The company has no obligation to
put the property to a use that will benefit the public as a whole, despite
having been required by the court to show a public use warranting the
exercise of eminent domain.
Although such a scenario may be hard to imagine, it is possible
based on current eminent domain jurisprudence. By allowing a condem-
nor to abandon the public use after condemnation, courts have expanded
condemnors' power while simultaneously limiting condemnees' ability
to protect themselves from fraudulent and speculative takings. Once a
condemnor can prove a prima facie public use for the property, the
condemnee has virtually no way to prevent the condemnation, nor can
the condemnee regain title to the property if the public use is abandoned.
This result is inequitable because it allows condemnors to unfairly
manipulate the doctrine of eminent domain for their own personal gain,
rather than for the benefit of the public.
Courts that allow condemnors to abandon the public use of the
property after condemnation through eminent domain, without providing
any corresponding substantive or procedural rights for condemnees, ig-
nore the public use requirements of the U.S. and Washington constitu-
tions. To level the field between condemnor and condemnee rights, four
changes should occur. First, courts should stop presuming condemnors
act in good faith when bringing condemnation proceedings. Second,
courts should decide whether the property at issue is necessary for the
project, as well as whether the type of interest sought is necessary, in-
stead of deferring to legislative determinations regarding these issues.
Third, condemnors should be required to put the property to a public use
within a reasonable period of time and should continue that use for a
specified period. Finally, condemnees should have the right to repur-
chase the property at the original condemnation price if the public use
does not occur within a reasonable period of time or if the condemnor
fails to satisfy the statutory period of public use.
This Comment is divided into six parts. Part II examines the his-
torical and constitutional understandings and application of eminent do-
main and the public use requirement. Part III analyzes cases decided un-
der the U.S. and Washington constitutions in which courts upheld con-
demnors' rights to abandon or fail to fulfill the public use of the
condemned property. Part IV discusses cases outside of Washington in
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which courts have upheld the validity of takings even though the con-
demnor subsequently abandoned or failed to fulfill the public use. These
cases illustrate the need for more substantive and procedural protections
for condemnees. Part V argues that allowing condemnors to abandon the
public use is inconsistent with the public use requirement of the federal
and Washington constitutions. This Part also examines possible proce-
dural and substantive protections to protect condmnees from arbitrary or
speculative takings and recommends that the legislature
enact some, but not all, of these protections.
1I. HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDINGS OF EMINENT DOMAIN AND
PUBLIC USE UNDER THE U.S. AND WASHINGTON CONSTITUTIONS
Eminent domain is the power of states, cities, and other authorized
entities, such as power companies, to condemn private property for a
public use.2 The Fifth Amendment guarantees, among other things, that
private property can only be taken for a public use and only when just
compensation is paid.3 This portion of the Amendment, known as the
Takings Clause, ensures that select individuals are not forced to bear the
burden of public projects that should be borne by the entire public. 4 The
Washington constitution has a similar provision,5 although its precise
6boundaries differ in important ways from the Fifth Amendment. This
Part examines the historical development of the public use requirement
2. Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. of Wash. v. State, 142 Wash. 2d 347, 369, 13 P.3d 183, 194
(2000) (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 523 (6th ed. 1990)).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
5. See WASH. CONST. art. 1, §16 (amended 1920). The eminent domain provision of the Wash-
ington constitution states,
Private property shall not be taken for private use, except for private ways of necessity,
and for drains, flumes, or ditches on or across the lands of others for agricultural, domes-
tic, or sanitary purposes. No private property shall be taken or damaged for public or pri-
vate use without just compensation having been first made, or paid into court for the
owner, and no right-of-way shall be apportioned to the use of any corporation other than
municipal until full compensation therefor be first made in money, or ascertained and
paid into court for the owner, irrespective of any benefit from any improvement proposed
by such corporation, which compensation shall be ascertained by a jury, unless a jury be
waived, as in other civil cases in courts of record, in the manner prescribed by law.
Whenever an attempt is made to take private property for a use alleged to be public, the
question whether the contemplated use be really public shall be a judicial question, and
determined as such, without regard to any legislative assertion that the use is public: Pro-
vided, That the taking of private property by the state for land reclamation and settlement
purposes is hereby declared to be for public use.
Id.
6. See infra Part 11.CI.
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under both the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 7 and article I,
§ 16 of the Washington constitution.
8
A. Historical Influences on and Understandings of Public Use
Under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
Governments have exercised the power of eminent domain for cen-
turies, long before the U.S. Constitution included the Takings Clause;9
however, scholars disagree as to where the power of eminent domain
originated.1° Most scholars believe that eminent domain is an inherent
power of sovereignty.11 As such, the Takings Clause limits the govern-
ment's eminent domain power, rather than granting the government
eminent domain power. In other words, because the government as a
sovereign entity necessarily possesses the power of eminent domain,
1 2
the Fifth Amendment merely limits that power to takings for a public use
and requires that when the power is exercised, the government pay the
owner just compensation.1
3
Determining exactly what the framers intended by the Takings
Clause is difficult. Although the text of the Takings Clause is seemingly
clear, there are little or no records of debate about the clause. 4 More-
over, there is disagreement among scholars as to which political ideolo-
gies likely influenced the framers' understandings of eminent domain.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
8. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16 (amended 1920).
9. HENRY E. MILLS, A TREATISE UPON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN 2 (1879).
10. William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 557-
58 (1972). A handful of early cases advocated for a "reserved power theory," meaning that the gov-
ernment holds an inherent exception in the title of all property that it can exercise whenever it
chooses. Id. at 557 (citing, as examples, Donnaher v. State, 16 Miss. 649 (8 S. & M. 649) (1847);
Cushman v. Smith, 34 Me. 247, 259-60 (1852)). However, this theory is problematic as a basis for
eminent domain in the United States because the theory would not require compensation of any kind.
Instead, the government could simply exercise the right it already has in the title to the property. See
Stoebuck, supra, at 558. Because the theory is problematic, most commentators look to other theo-
ries to explain eminent domain in the United States. See id at 559.
1I. Stoebuck, supra note 10, at 559 (citing 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN
LAW 339 (2nd ed. New York, Halsted (1832))); Robert Kratovil & Frank J. Harrison, Jr., Eminent
Domain-Policy and Concept, 42 CAL. L. REV. 596, 596 (1954)). See also I JULIUS L. SACKMAN,
NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.11, at 1-7 to 1-9 (rev. 3d ed. 1997). The Supreme Court took a
similar position in Kohl v. United States, stating that the government has the power of eminent do-
main because "such an authority is essential to its independent existence and perpetuity." 91 U.S.
367, 371 (1875).
12. See Stoebuck, supra note 10, at 560. As Stoebuck notes, it is not true that the power of
eminent domain is necessary for the government to remain sovereign. Id. Government could still
function, albeit not as effectively, even if it did not have the power of eminent domain. Id.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
14. William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the
Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 791 (1995). While ratifying the Constitution, the states
suggested amendments for every provision in the Bill of Rights except the Takings Clause. Id.
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Some scholars believe that republicanism was the dominant influ-
ence on the framers' understanding of property. 5 Classic republicanism
advocated the importance of private property, particularly land, as the
prerequisite to participation in civic affairs.16 Classic republicans thought
that only private property owners were independent enough to make ra-
tional judgments and not be swayed by others in their decision-making.
7
Classic republicans also believed that the legislature promoted the "pub-
lic good," which was thought to include everyone's interests.' 8 Thus,
under classic republicanism, it was not problematic in terms of individual
rights when the government exercised eminent domain because the gov-
ernment, by definition, worked to promote the public good. 19 Even if
private property was taken by the government, the property would have
to be put to a use that promoted the public good. z° Consequently, the
property owner still benefited, even if his or her property was taken.
Conversely, some scholars believe that John Locke was the primary
influence on the framers' understanding of property rights, and thus emi-
nent domain.2' Locke argued that government was created, in part, to
protect property, and this protection was the reason individuals chose to
leave the state of nature and enter into society.22 Locke argued that gov-
ernment could not take property without the owner's consent because if
government could do so the property owner would lose the only reason
for entering into society in the first place, namely the protection of prop-
23 2erty. James Madison 4 was particularly influenced by Locke when he
wrote, "Government is instituted to protect property of every sort ...
This being the end of government, that alone is a just government, which
impartially secures to every man, whatever is his own.'2 5
15. Nathan Alexander Sales, Note, Classical Republicanism and the Fifth Amendment's
"Public Use" Requirement, 49 DUKE L.J. 339, 342 (1999).
16.Id. at 355.
17. Id. (citing FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS
OF THE CONSTITUTION 74 (1985); Gregory S. Alexander, Time and Property in the American Repub-
lican Legal Culture, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 273, 298 (1991); Treanor, supra note 14, at 821).
18. Sales, supra note 15, at 358.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 16, 29 (1985); Donald J. Kochan, "Public Use" and the Independent Judiciary:
Condemnation in an Interest-Group Perspective, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 49, 54-55 (1998).
22. JOHN LOCKE, LOCKE'S SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 56 (Lester DeKoster
ed., abr., William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company 1978) (1690).
23. Id. at 62.
24. James Madison was one of the leading contributors to the U.S. Constitution and was Presi-
dent of the United States from 1809-17. GARRY WILLS, JAMES MADISON 1, 57, 119 (2002).
25. Kochan, supra note 21, at 55 (citing James Madison, Property, NATIONAL GAZETTE (Mar.
27, 1792), reprinted in 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266 (Robert Rutland et al. eds., 1983)
(emphasis in original)).
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Regardless of which theory actually influenced the framers' under-
standing of eminent domain and the role of government in protecting
property, the Takings Clause's public use requirement remains intact.
Under republicanism, government can only work to promote the public
good.26 Thus, when it exercises eminent domain, the government neces-
sarily puts the property to a use that will be in the public's interest. 7 If a
project is in the public's interest, it would likely satisfy the public use
requirement as currently formulated by the courts.28 In contrast, under
the Lockean tradition, private property must be protected from govern-
ment interference; therefore, eminent domain is only allowed when the
property will be put to a public use, since the property owner will still in
some sense benefit from the property.29 Nonetheless, under either the
Lockean or republican formulation of eminent domain, public use
remains a necessary component.
In addition to the influences of Locke and classic republicanism,
the framers may have included a public use requirement in recognition of
the idea that real estate, and more specifically one's home, is something
that cannot always be adequately compensated monetarily. For many
people, property is their "foundation for 'self-determination and self-
expression.' 30 Additionally, property can be viewed as indistinguishable
from liberty.3 1 As one scholar notes, "'[d]isplacement from one's home,
however mitigated by compensation, effectively defeats' a person's
autonomy., 32 By restricting the government's exercise of eminent do-
main to those instances where the public will benefit from the condemna-
tion, the framers likely recognized the importance of private property not
only to one's political participation, but also to one's ability to be a
complete citizen.
26. See supra text accompanying notes 15-20.
27. See supra text accompanying notes 15-20.
28. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 35-48.
29. See supra text accompanying notes 21-25.
30. Ralph Nader & Alan Hirsch, Making Eminent Domain Humane, 49 VILL. L. REV. 207, 216
(2004) (quoting Frank I. Michelman, Mr. Justice Brennan: A Property Teacher's Appreciation, 15
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 296,298-99 (1980)).
31. Id. at 216 (citing Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957,
959 (1982)).
32. Id. (quoting Laura Mansnerus, Public Use, Private Use, and Judicial Review in Eminent
Domain, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 409,431 (1983)).
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B. Judicial Interpretations of the Public Use
Requirement Under the Fifth Amendment
Although public use is a seemingly narrow term,33 there are two
primary ways courts could interpret the public use requirement. 34 A court
could interpret the clause literally and hold that the public must actually
be able to use the property in order to satisfy the public use requirement.
In early decisions, a few courts adopted this literal approach to public
use. 35 Conversely, a court could interpret the clause more broadly and
hold that if the condemnation benefits the public in any way, the public
use requirement is satisfied.
Since the Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Berman v. Parker,
36
courts deciding condemnation actions have adopted the broad view of
eminent domain and public use. In Berman, Congress passed the District
of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945 to rid the city of blighted and
slum housing, and the city planned to use eminent domain to condemn
blighted property and redevelop it. 37 The plaintiffs owned land in an area
designated for redevelopment, although the land they owned was not
blighted nor was it slum housing; rather, it was a department store in
good condition. 38 They challenged the taking, claiming that their prop-
erty could not legally be condemned since it was in good condition and
did not contribute to the dilapidated conditions in the city.39 The Court
rejected the plaintiffs' argument, holding that the city could exercise
eminent domain to effectuate the community redevelopment plan, even
though plaintiffs' property was not deteriorated. 40 According to the
33. Kochan, supra note 21, at 61. By choosing the phrase "public use," rather than a broader
phrase such as "public benefit" or "public interest," the framers intended to limit the power of emi-
nent domain. Id.
34. See Timothy Dwight Benedict, The Public Use Requirement in Washington After State ex
rel. Washington State Convention and Trade Center v. Evans, 75 WASH. L. REV. 225, 227 (2000);
Lawrence Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV. 203, 205 (1978);
Sales, supra note 15, at 344 (citing 2A JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN §
7.01[5], at 7-20 to 7-21 (rev. 3d ed. 1999); Stoebuck, supra note 10, at 591). There is arguably a
third way in which a court could interpret the Takings Clause, namely that the Clause requires com-
pensation only when the taking occurs for a public use. Sales, supra note 15, at 344; Stoebuck, supra
note 10, at 591. Thus, it is argued, the Clause says nothing about the government taking property for
private uses. See Sales, supra note 15, at 344; Stoebuck, supra note 10, at 591. However, no court
has held that the Takings Clause permits takings for purely private purposes.
35. Stoebuck, supra note 10, at 589 (citing Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson R.R., 18 Wend.
9, 56-62 (1837) (comments of Senator Tracy)). Under this literal approach, condemnation for eco-
nomic redevelopment, see infra text accompanying notes 43-45, would not be allowed, as the public
is not actually able to use all of the property once the condemnation is complete.
36. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
37. Id. at 28.
38.Id. at 31.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 32.
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Court, the legislature determined such redevelopment was necessary by
passing the Act.41 Thus, the Court found that it had only a narrow role in
42determining whether the project was a proper public use.
Recently, the Court reaffirmed its broad interpretation of public
use. In Kelo v. City of New London, the Court upheld New London's ex-
ercise of eminent domain to effectuate a development plan, the purpose
of which was to create jobs, increase tax and other revenue, and "revital-
ize an economically distressed city. '43 Under the plan, any property that
fell into the area designated for redevelopment could be condemned,
regardless of whether that property was actually blighted. 4 Additionally,
private developers would acquire some of the property through long-term
leases. 45 The Court rejected the petitioners' claim that the plan did not
satisfy the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment and stated,
"For more than a century, our public use jurisprudence has wisely es-
chewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legis-
latures broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of
the takings power., 46 Because the city determined such a plan was neces-
sary, and the plan served a "public purpose," the plan satisfied the public
use requirement.47 The Court did not find it problematic that private
developers would acquire some of the property because the identity of
the developers had not yet been determined. Therefore, petitioners'
argument that the condemnation was actually to benefit private parties,
and was thus for a private purpose, was unfounded.48
Even under the current broad formulation of public use, however,
the Court still requires at least a prima facie showing that the taking will
in fact benefit the public. The benefit may come in the form of a better
planned community, 49 dispersion of land from ownership concentra-
41. Id. at 29.
42. Id. at 32. In reality, the Court played no role in determining whether redevelopment of a
blighted area was a proper public use, but instead deferred to the legislature. The Court stated, "Sub-
ject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has
been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases the legislature, not the judiciary, is the
main guardian of the public needs to be served by social legislation ..... Id. The exercise of emi-
nent domain to effectuate an urban renewal plan is at odds with the nineteenth century view of pub-
lic use, which considered the use of eminent domain for urban renewal to be illegal. THOMAS M.
COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE
POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 660 (5th ed. 1883).
43. 545 U.S. 469, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2658 (2005).
44. Id. at 2660.
45. Id. at 2662 n.6.
46. Id. at 2664.
47. Id. at 2665.
48. Id. at 2662 n.6.
49. See supra text accompanying notes 36-41.
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tion, 50 or an urban renewal plan,5 1 all of which are quite different than the
uses of eminent domain at the time the Takings Clause was ratified.
52
However, the public use must be shown nonetheless. Additionally, the
Court still seems to support the notion that takings cannot occur for the
sole purpose of transferring ownership of property from A to B, even if B
would put the property to a more economically beneficial use than A. 53
C. Judicial Interpretations of Eminent Domain in Washington
Overall, Washington has provided more property protection in its
constitution and case law than has been provided under the U.S. Consti-
tution.54 Part of this difference stems from the textual differences
between the Washington and U.S. Constitutions, but those differences
alone do not explain the disparity.
Washington courts have adopted six non-exclusive factors, com-
monly referred to as the Gunwall factors, that a court should analyze
when determining whether the Washington constitution provides more
rights to its citizens in a particular area than the Federal Constitution.55
These factors include an examination of the following: (1) the state con-
stitutional text; (2) the textual differences between the state and federal
provisions at issue; (3) Washington constitutional and common law his-
tory; (4) preexisting state law; (5) structural differences between the state
and federal constitutions; and (6) whether the clause at issue addresses
"matters of particular state or local concern. 56 This section discusses the
Gunwall factors as applied to the eminent domain provisions of the
Washington constitution and illustrates that Washington courts have
historically provided more property protection under the state
constitution than other courts have provided under the U.S. Constitution.
1. Factors One, Two, and Five: Textual Comparison
of the Washington and U.S. Constitutions
The first, second, and fifth Gunwall factors together require a com-
parison of the text of the Washington constitution with that of the Fifth
50. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241-242 (1984) (upholding a Hawaii
statute that allowed the state to condemn private property from owners who owned large percentages
of the land in order to disperse ownership among a great number of citizens).
51. See supra text accompanying notes 43-48.
52. See Berger, supra note 34, at 205. The most common uses for eminent domain shortly after
the Constitution's ratification were road building and milldams. Id.
53. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2661 (2005).
54. Compare supra text accompanying notes 36-48, with infra text accompanying notes 57-
112.
55. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 58, 720 P.2d 808, 811 (1986).
56. Id., 720 P.2d at 811.
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Amendment.57 The text of the eminent domain section of the Washington
constitution is markedly different from that of the Takings Clause.
Where the latter simply states, "nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation,' 58 article I, § 16 of Washington's
constitution states:
Private property shall not be taken for private use, except for private
ways of necessity, and for drains, flumes, or ditches on or across the
lands of others for agricultural, domestic, or sanitary purposes. No
private property shall be taken or damaged for public or private use
without just compensation having been first made .... Whenever
an attempt is made to take private property for a use alleged to be
public, the question whether the contemplated use be really public
shall be a judicial question, and determined as such, without regard
to any legislative assertion that the use is public: Provided, That the
taking of private property by the state for land reclamation and set-
tlement purposes is hereby declared to be for public use.59
While this formulation of eminent domain is much longer and more
detailed than its federal counterpart, judges in Washington actually
have more discretion when determining what is and is not a public use
61than judges deciding cases under the Takings Clause. In Washington,
public use is a judicial determination. 62 While under the Fifth Amend-
ment courts defer to legislative judgments of public use,63 the
Washington constitution explicitly provides for public use in Washington
to be a judicial determination. Additionally, while the U.S. Constitution
grants enumerated powers to the federal government, the Washington
constitution restrains the "otherwise plenary powers of the state govern-
ment."
64
Another difference between the two documents is that the Washing-
65ton constitution explicitly prohibits taking property for private uses.
57. See supra text accompanying note 56.
58. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
59. WASH. CONST. art. 1, §16 (amended 1920).
60. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. V, with WASH. CONST. art. 1, §16 (amended 1920).
61. Compare WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 16 (amended 1920) (giving judges the power to determine
which projects constitute a public use), with Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). However, judges
in Washington also give deference to legislative determinations of public use, although the extent of
that deference has varied over time. See infra text accompanying notes 83-104.
62. WASH. CONST. art. 1, §16 (amended 1920).
63. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2664-65 (2005)
("Those who govern the City were not confronted with the need to remove blight in the Fort Trum-
bull area, but their determination that the area was sufficiently distressed to justify a program of
economic rejuvenation is entitled to our deference.").
64. Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. of Wash. v. State, 142 Wash. 2d 347, 360, 13 P.3d 183, 189-
90 (2000).
65.1d. at 357-58, 13 P.3d at 188.
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Although courts deciding Takings Clause cases have consistently held
that condemnors cannot exercise eminent domain for private purposes,
66
the explicit prohibition against takings for private purposes in the
Washington constitution provides a further layer of protection for
condemnees not found in the text of the Fifth Amendment. 7
2. Factor Three: Washington Constitutional and Common Law History
Determining the framers' intent regarding the Washington constitu-
tion, particularly article I, § 16, is difficult. Washington ratified its con-
stitution in 1889,68 before the Federal Bill of Rights applied to the
states.69 Generally, little historical information exists regarding the
Washington constitution, which makes it difficult to determine the intent
of the framers when courts interpret the Washington constitution.70 Addi-
tionally, there was particularly little debate about the eminent domain
section of the constitution, so the few records that do exist are of little
help.7' Of the little information available, it is known that two efforts to
eliminate the power to take property for private ways of necessity were
easily defeated. 72 Also, several delegates to the Washington constitu-
tional convention "were strongly opposed to various exceptions to the
absolute prohibition against taking private property for private use.,
73
However, these events shed little light on what the framers meant by the
term "public use." At best, these events tell us only that the framers did
not want condemnors to exercise eminent domain for purely private
purposes, yet there should be instances in which condemnors can exer-
cise eminent domain when the proposed use will not be entirely public.
The precise boundaries of what constitutes a "public use," however,
remain unclear.
The social and political context in which the Washington framers
wrote their constitution is quite different from that in which the framers
66. See supra text accompanying notes 49-53.
67. Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. of Wash., 142 Wash. 2d at 357-58, 13 P.3d at 188.
68. James M. Dolliver, Condemnation, Credit, and Corporations in Washington: 100 Years of
Judicial Decisions-Have the Framers' Views Been Followed?, 12 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 163,
163 (1989). The Washington constitution was drafted on August 22, 1889, and was ratified on
October 1, 1889. Id.
69. ROBERT F. UTTER & HUGH D. SPITZER, THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION: A
REFERENCE GUIDE 3 (2002).
70. Id. at 1.
71. Dolliver, supra note 68, at 171.
72. Id. at 172 (citing QUENTIN SHIPLEY SMITH, THE JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 1889, at 504-05 (Beverly Paulik Rosenow ed., 1962)).
73. Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. of Wash. v. State, 142 Wash. 2d 347, 359, 13 P.3d 183, 189
(2000) (citing QUENTIN SHIPLEY SMITH, THE JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 1889, at 504-06 (Beverly Paulik Rosenow ed., 1962)).
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of the U.S. Constitution worked and lived. Perhaps the most obvious dif-
ferences between the experiences of the Washington framers and that of
the federal constitutional framers are historical and geographical. 74 Al-
though some of the language in the eminent domain section of the
Washington constitution is similar to that of the Fifth Amendment, 75 "the
vast differences in culture, politics, experience, education, and economic
status between the Northwestern framers of 1889 and the Eastern framers
of the U.S. Bill of Rights in 1789" make any comparisons of intent
between the drafters of the Washington constitution and the Federal Bill
of Rights tenuous at best.
76
Although it is not entirely clear what the Washington constitutional
framers meant by terms such as public use, it seems that they intended to
provide more property protection in Washington than the U.S. Constitu-
tion provides. The Washington framers likely wanted to make it more
difficult for the state and municipalities to exercise eminent domain by
requiring the judiciary, as opposed to the legislature, to determine
whether a use is actually public. By not deferring to legislative determi-
nations, the framers sent a clear signal that legislatures could not be
trusted to make objective determinations of public use.77
Even if one could determine the intent of the framers of the Wash-
ington constitution, not everyone agrees that the framers' intent should
control.78 For example, some scholars argue that the intent of the people
should control, as the Constitution begins, "We the people., 79 Another
74. The U.S. Constitution was written in 1787 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. U.S. CONST. art.
VII. The Washington constitution was written in Olympia, Washington, in 1889. Dolliver, supra
note 68, at 163.
75. The Washington constitution states, in part, "No private property shall be taken or damaged
for public or private use without just compensation having been first made." WASH. CONST. art. 1,
§16 (amended 1920). Similarly, the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states, in part, "[N]or
shall private property be taken for public uses, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
76. UTTER & SPITZER, supra note 69, at 3-4.
77. Dolliver, supra note 68, at 173. Interestingly, Washington courts have recently provided a
considerable amount of deference to legislative determinations of public use despite the constitu-
tional mandate that public use be a judicial determination. See infra text accompanying notes 83-
104. See also, e.g., Cent. Puget Sound Reg'I Transit Auth. v. Miller, 156 Wash. 2d 403, 411 n.2, 128
P.3d 588, 593 n.2 (2006) (citing City of Des Moines v. Hemenway, 73 Wash. 2d 130, 138-39, 437
P.2d 171, 176 (1968) (stating "while the determination of public use is for the courts, this court has
explicitly stated that it will show great deference to legislative determinations.").
78. Compare Dolliver, supra note 68, at 166 (arguing that an examination of the framers' intent
is necessary to understand constitutional provisions), with UTTER & SPITZER, supra note 69, at 8
(citing John Sundquist, Construction of the Wisconsin Constitution-Recurrence to Fundamental
Principles, 62 MARQ. L. REV. 531, 535 (1979)), and COOLEY, supra note 42, at 6 (arguing that the
people's intent should control the meaning of constitutional provisions).
79. UTTER & SPITZER, supra note 69, at 8 (citing John Sundquist, Construction of the Wiscon-
sin Constitution-Recurrence to Fundamental Principles, 62 MARQ. L. REV. 531, 535 (1979)); see
also Albright v. City of Spokane, 64 Wash. 2d 767, 770, 394 P.2d 231, 233 (1964) ("It is axiomatic
that words in the constitution must be given their common and ordinary meaning. This is so because
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approach is to say that it is not only the people's intent that controls, but
also "the general intent and philosophy that underlie the entire constitu-
tion."' However, it is no more clear what "the people" thought of the
public use requirement than it is clear what the framers thought, nor does
"the general intent and philosophy" of the entire constitution provide
much guidance.
3. Factor Four: Preexisting State Law
The Washington Supreme Court has adopted a three part test for
determining whether a proposed condemnation is lawful under the state
constitution. 81 "For a proposed condemnation to be lawful, the condemn-
ing authority must prove that (1) the use is really public, (2) the public
interest requires it, and (3) the property appropriated is necessary for that
purpose." 82 The determination of whether a use is public is a question for
the judiciary, although legislative pronouncements of public use are enti-
tled to great deference. 83 Courts defer to legislative determinations for
the latter two prongs.84
In some cases, Washington courts have narrowly interpreted what
constitutes a public use, thus protecting private property rights. For
example, in Hogue v. Port of Seattle, the court held that the legislature
violated the state constitution by passing an act authorizing the Port of
Seattle to condemn land in order to build industrial sites that would be
operated by or sold to private individuals and corporations8 6 Because
this exercise of eminent domain would have taken land from private
property owners and given it to private corporations that, in the Port of
Seattle's view, would put the land to a better use, the taking was specifi-
the constitution is the expression of the people's will, adopted by them."); COOLEY, supra note 42, at
6.
80. UTTER & SPITZER, supra note 69, at 8
(It was undoubtedly part of the people's intent to create a system of government [that]
guaranteed rights that conformed with all the then-current principles of democracy, repre-
sentative government, state sovereignty, and fundamental human rights. This general
intent should be considered and honored whenever a party urges a construction of the
constitution that appears to violate any of these basic principles, whether expressly stated
in the constitution or not.).
81. HTK Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Seattle Popular Monorail Auth., 155 Wash. 2d 612, 629, 121 P.3d
1166, 1174-75 (2005) (citing State ex rel. Wash. State Convention & Trade Ctr. v. Evans, 136
Wash. 2d. 811,817, 966 P.2d 1252, 1255 (1998)).
82. Id. at 629, 121 P.3d at 1174-75 (citing State ex rel. Wash. State Convention & Trade Ctr.
v. Evans, 136 Wash. 2d. 811,817, 966 P.2d 1252, 1255 (1986)).
83. Id. at 629, 121 P.3d at 1175 (citing In re City of Seattle, 96 Wash. 2d 616, 624-25, 638
P.2d 549, 555 (1981)).
84.1d. at 629-30, 121 P.3d at 1175.
85. See infra text accompanying notes 86-95.
86.54 Wash. 2d 799, 825, 827, 341 P.2d 171, 186, 187 (1959).
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cally prohibited by the Washington constitution.87 That is to say, the tak-
ing was nothing more than taking property for a private purpose. 88 Al-
though the legislature had determined such uses were in fact public uses,
the court said:
No matter how desirable from an operating standpoint the Port's
exclusive control of land use in a given area may appear to be, it is
the duty of the courts to uphold the rights of private property against
the inroads of public bodies who seek to acquire it for private pur-
poses which they honestly believe to be essential for the public
good. 89
Similarly, in In re City of Seattle, the court again struck down an
attempted exercise of eminent domain, reasoning that the taking was not
for a public use.90 In that case, the city of Seattle attempted to condemn
property in order to effectuate the Westlake Project,9' which is the cur-
rent Westlake Center shopping mall and surrounding land in downtown
Seattle.92 As originally formulated, the city intended to condemn land
under the Westlake Project in order to lease some of the property to pri-
vate retail shops. 93 The court struck down this use of eminent domain,
holding that "where the purpose of a proposed acquisition is to acquire
property and devote only a portion of it to truly public uses, the remain-
der to be rented or sold for private use, the project does not constitute a
public use., 94 Because the retail shops were not merely incidental to the
other proposed purposes of the project, which included creating a public
square and museum, but rather were central to the project, the project
could not be considered a public use.95
Although these two decisions protect private property rights to the
extent possible under the state constitution, Washington courts have not
always done so. For example, in State ex rel. Washington State
Convention and Trade Center v. Evans, the court held that the state had
the authority to condemn property to expand the Washington State Con-
vention and Trade Center, even though part of the land would be sold to
a private developer for retail shopping space.96 The court first reasoned
87. Id. at 827, 341 P.2d at 187.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 838, 341 P.2d at 193.
90. 96 Wash. 2d 616, 625, 638 P.2d 549, 555 (1981).
91. Id. at 618, 638 P.2d at 551.
92. Westlake Center is a retail shopping mall that includes a station for the first and only Seat-
tle Monorail. For more information, see http://www.westlakecenter.com.
93. In re City of Seattle, 96 Wash. 2d at 623, 638 P.2d at 554.
94. Id. at 627-28, 638 P.2d at 556.
95. Id. at 629, 638 P.2d at 557.
96. 136 Wash. 2d 811,813, 815,966 P.2d 1252, 1253-1254 (1998).
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that the private use of the property, namely the retail shops, was merely
incidental to the public use and did not impermissibly mix private and
public uses in violation of the constitution. 97 The court attempted to dis-
tinguish this case from In re City of Seattle on the grounds that the pri-
mary purpose of the condemnation in this case was to expand the
exhibition space of the Convention Center, whereas in In re City of
Seattle, the primary purpose of the project was to add retail shops. 98 Be-
cause the state could expand the exhibit space without the private devel-
opment, the court reasoned, the fact that private development was occur-
ring along with the public use of expanding the exhibit hall was immate-
rial. 99 Moreover, the court rejected the argument that since the private
development was partially funding the expansion of the exhibit hall, that
necessarily "corrupt[ed] the public nature of that project."10 0 Even though
private development was economically essential to the project moving
forward, the court did not find this problematic in terms of the public use
analysis of the overall project.10 1 Finally, the court held that a legislature
determination that condemning the property was necessary to effectuate
the project was "conclusive in the absence of proof of actual fraud or
such arbitrary and capricious conduct as would constitute constructive
fraud."' 2 Since the property owners could not produce evidence of fraud
or arbitrary and capricious conduct, the court upheld the exercise of emi-
nent domain.10 3 The court made this "determination" in spite of the state
constitutional requirement that the judiciary, not the legislature, deter-
mine whether a proposed use really is public.1
0 4
Hogue, In re City of Seattle, and State ex rel. Washington State
Convention and Trade Center represent the most current public use
jurisprudence in Washington. As the courts have oscillated between two
conceptions of public use, the most recent of which is far less demanding
of the condemnor, it is not entirely clear what "public use" means in
Washington. 10 5 Courts originally seemed to require that the entire project
be a public use, but recently courts seem to be more open to mixed
uses.
10 6
97. Id. at 819, 966 P.2d at 1256.
98. Id. at 819-20, 966 P.2d at 1256.
99. Id. at 820, 966 P.2d at 1257.
100. Id. at 819, 966 P.2d at 1256.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 823, 966 P.2d at 1258.
103. Id.
104. WASH. CONST. art. 1, §16 (amended 1920).
105. See supra text accompanying notes 83-104.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 83-104.
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Given the most recent cases, Washington courts have expanded the
acceptable bounds of public use in a way that is detrimental to private
property protection. While Washington has historically given its citizens
greater property protection by defining public use literally 0 7 (by contrast,
federal courts have broadly interpreted public use under the Takings
Clause'0 8), the future is unclear as to whether Washington courts will
continue to provide greater property protection under the state
constitution or follow the federal model.
Some Washingtonians still believe that the state constitution pro-
tects property rights better than the Federal Constitution. °9 After the
U.S. Supreme Court's controversial decision in Kelo v. City of New
London, which upheld an exercise of eminent domain to effectuate an
economic redevelopment plan under the Fifth Amendment," 0 Washing-
ton Attorney General Rob McKenna issued a statement saying that con-
demnations of the type at issue in Kelo would potentially be struck down
in Washington due to a more strict definition of "public benefit.""'
Interestingly, McKenna chose to use the words "public benefit" rather
than "pubic use," thereby indicating that the nature of eminent domain
has greatly expanded both nationally and here in Washington." 2 Thus,
107. Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. of Wash. v. State, 142 Wash. 2d 347, 360, 13 P.3d 183, 189
(2000). Although the court claims to have consistently applied a literal definition of public use, the
court has arguably not done so. See supra text accompanying notes 83-104.
108. Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. of Wash., 142 Wash. 2d at 359, 13 P.3d at 189. For example,
while federal courts have held that as long as "the legislature's purpose is legitimate and its means
not irrational, a legislative taking can and will withstand a public use challenge [under the Federal
Constitution] provided just compensation is paid," id. at 360 (citing Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff,
467 U.S. 229, 242 (1984)), Washington courts have declined to adopt such a broad interpretation.
See supra Part 1I.C.3.
109. See Editorial, Private vs. Public Land: Whose Property Right?, SEATLE TIMES, June 27,
2005, at B4.
110. 545 U.S. 469, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 2665 (2005).
111. Statement, Rob McKenna, Wash. State Attorney Gen., Attorney General McKenna Com-
ments on the Use of Eminent Domain for Private Purposes (June 23, 2005) (2005 WLNR
10026979). In 2006, there were nine bills proposed in the Washington Legislature that were written
to specifically outlaw condemnations like those that occurred in Kelo, namely condemnations for
"economic redevelopment." See H.B. 2427, 59th Leg., 2006 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006); H.B. 2626,
59th Leg., 2006 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006); H.B. 2854, 59th Leg., 2006 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006); H.B.
2924, 59th Leg., 2006 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006); H.B. 3017, 59th Leg., 2006 Reg. Sess. (Wash.
2006); H.J. Res. 4217, 59th Leg., 2006 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006); S.B. 6345, 59th Leg., 2006 Reg.
Sess. (Wash. 2006); S.B. 6388, 59th Leg., 2006 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006); S.B. 6701, 59th Leg., 2006
Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006). If Attorney General McKenna was correct in stating that condemnations
like those in Kelo would potentially be struck down in Washington, then there would be no need for
a law to specifically outlaw such condemnations. This highlights that the definition of public use has
expanded such that even the Washington Attorney General cannot state with any certainty whether a
condemnation for economic redevelopment would be upheld or not under Washington case law.
112. Compare Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. of Wash. v. State, 142 Wash. 2d 347, 371-73, 13
P.3d 183, 195-96 (2000) (stating that "public purpose" and "public use" are not the same thing, only
the latter being an appropriate basis for condemnation through eminent domain; holding that "al-
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although Washington supposedly provides more property protection un-
der its state constitution than is provided by the Federal Constitution,
private property may not be as protected in Washington as some believe
it is.
4. Factor Six: Whether the Clause at Issue Addresses a
Matter of Particular State or Local Concern
The Washington Supreme Court has determined, with little or no
analysis, that private property rights and the exercise of eminent domain
are matters of local concern. 13
As this review of the application of the Gunwall factors to eminent
domain illustrates, Washington courts should provide substantially more
property rights protection under the Washington constitution than other
courts provide under the U.S. Constitution. First, the text of the Wash-
ington constitution provides explicit protections not present in the U.S.
Constitution.' 14 Second, although decisions have been mixed in recent
years, Washington courts have historically interpreted public use in a
narrow way, such that private property rights are more protected under
the Washington constitution."15 However, it is unclear whether this re-
mains true today."16 Finally, Washington courts have held that private
property rights and the exercise of eminent domain are matters of local
concern, thus making it more likely that the Washington constitution
provides greater property protection than the U.S. Constitution.
17
Because little is known about the intent of the Washington framers
regarding terms such as public use, Washington's constitutional and
common law history provides little insight into whether the Washington
constitution in fact provides greater property protections. However, as
this representative review of Washington case law reveals, it seems as
though Washington courts are not consistently providing as much prop-
erty protection as they could and should under the state constitution.
In summary, the current broad formulation of public use under the
Takings Clause, as well as the unstable view of public use under the
though preserving dwindling housing stocks for a particularly vulnerable segment of society pro-
vides a 'public benefit,' this public benefit does not constitute a public use"), with State ex reL
Wash. State Convention & Trade Ctr. v. Evans, 136 Wash. 2d 811, 820, 966 P.2d 1252, 1257 (1998)
(holding that the private development involved in the expansion of the convention center was merely
a "means to an end, but it is not an end in and of itself," and thus did not corrupt the public nature of
the overall expansion project).
113. Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. of Wash., 142 Wash. 2d at 361, 13 P.3d at 190.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 57-67.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 85-95.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 96-108.
117. See supra text accompanying note 113.
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Washington constitution, is problematic from the private property
owner's perspective because any legislative pronouncement of public use
means that a family could lose its home." 8 Under the U.S. Constitution,
the Court has defined public use so broadly that virtually any benefit to
the public, no matter how slight, will satisfy the public use requirement
of the Fifth Amendment."19 Although Washington courts have not de-
fined public use as broadly as the U.S. Supreme Court has, it is not
entirely clear what constitutes a public use in Washington due to seem-
ingly contradictory opinions.' Thus, private property owners are left
with almost no protection under the U.S. Constitution and uncertain pro-
tection under the Washington constitution from takings that primarily
benefit private parties, not the entire public. However, these are by no
means the only obstacles property owners must overcome in protecting
their property.
D. Washington Courts Further Limit Property Protection by Deferring to
Condemnors' Desires Regarding the Type of Interest and A mount of
Property Necessary to Effectuate a Project
Recently, the Washington Supreme Court cemented its dedication
to providing fewer private property protections when it allowed a con-
demnor to take more property than was arguably necessary to effectuate
the public project.12 In HTK Management, L.L.C. v. Seattle Popular
Monorail Authority, the court upheld an exercise of eminent domain by
the city of Seattle in order to build the now-defunct Seattle Monorail.
22
While this decision may seem logical, as providing public transportation
is clearly a public use,' 23 a more detailed examination reveals the prob-
lematic nature of the decision in terms of private property protection. In
this case, HTK Management (HTK) owned a parking garage in down-
town Seattle that the city wanted to condemn in order to build monorail
118. Although a condemnee receives compensation for any property lost through eminent
domain, it is arguably impossible to adequately compensate a homeowner who does not want to sell
his or her property due to emotional ties to the home. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 36-48.
120. Compare Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 799, 827, 341 P.2d 171, 186, 187 (1959),
and In re City of Seattle, 96 Wash. 2d 616, 625, 638 P.2d 549, 555 (1981), with State ex rel. Wash.
State Convention & Trade Ctr. v. Evans, 136 Wash. 2d 811, 813, 815, 966 P.2d 1252, 1253-1254
(1998).
121. See HTK Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Seattle Popular Monorail Auth., 155 Wash. 2d 612, 616, 121
P.3d 1166, 1168 (2005).
122. Id.
123. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 8.12.030 (2004). This statute states, "Every city and town
and each unclassified city and town within the state of Washington, is hereby authorized and em-
powered to condemn land and property .. for streets, avenues, alleys, [and] highways." Id.
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stations. 124 HTK challenged the taking and claimed, among other things,
that the city did not need a fee simple absolute interest in the entire par-
cel. 125 Instead, HTK argued that the city needed a fee simple interest in
only a portion of the property and an easement in the remainder, as the
Seattle Monorail Project (SMP) had no plan to use the latter portion
indefinitely but rather needed it only for construction purposes. 126 Thus,
HTK urged the court to review SMP's decision to condemn a fee simple
interest in the entire parcel under the first prong of the public use test
(whether the use is public, which is a decision for the court) rather than
under the third prong (whether the property at issue and the interest
claimed is necessary, a decision in which courts defer to legislative
determinations). 127 The court rejected HTK's suggestion, holding instead
that "[a] declaration of necessity by a proper municipal authority is con-
clusive in the absence of actual fraud or arbitrary and capricious conduct,
as would constitute constructive fraud."12 8 The court noted that even
though SMP had no plan to put the entire parcel to a public use indefi-
nitely, it did plan to use the parcel for a public use for at least ten
years. 1 29 However, SMP admitted that the "excess" property could easily
be sold to help pay for the monorail project.130 Nevertheless, the court
overlooked this fact and held that SMP had fulfilled its burden of proving
a fee simple absolute interest was necessary rather than an easement.'
31
Thus, not only must private property owners in Washington over-
come overly broad definitions of public use in defending their property
rights, 132 they must also overcome legislative determinations of what
type of interest is necessary, as well as whether all of the land at issue is
necessary to complete the public project. 33 As to the latter portion of this
burden, the HTK Management court made it clear that it is virtually im-
possible for the property owner to overcome the legislative pronounce-
ment of necessity. 34 Once the legislature has determined the property is
124. HTK Mgmt., L.L.C., 155 Wash. 2d at 619, 121 P.3d at 1170.
125. Id. at 630, 121 P.3d at 1175.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 629, 121 P.3d at 1175 (citing City of Des Moines v. Hemenway, 73 Wash. 2d 130,
139, 437 P.2d 171, 177 (1968)).
129.id. at 633, 121 P.3d at 1177.
130. Id. at 636, 121 P.3d at 1178.
131. Id. at 638, 121 P.3d at 1179. The court also noted the cost of a fee simple interest versus
an easement, stating that the cost of an easement in addition to the "likely cost[s] of damages due to
a ground lessee" could easily be more expensive than a fee simple interest. Id
132. See supra text accompanying notes 85-108.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 121-3 1.
134. HTK Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Seattle Popular Monorail Auth., 155 Wash. 2d 612, 629, 121 P.3d
1166, 1175 (2005); see also supra text accompanying note 128.
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necessary and that a fee interest is necessary, the only thing left for the
property owner to do is to pack; even where the condemnor admits there
is "excess" property, the court is uninterested in questioning such
legislative determinations.
III. PUBLIC USE ABANDONMENT AND NON-FULFILLMENT
UNDER THE U.S. AND WASHINGTON CONSTITUTIONS
The courts' willingness to expand the definition of public use is
problematic from the private property owner's perspective, as is the def-
erence courts give to legislative determinations of the amount of land and
the type of interest required for the project. These problems illustrate the
ease in which private property rights can be stripped away. However,
there may be an even greater threat to private property rights.
From the private property owner's perspective, the power of con-
demnors to abandon or fail to carry out the public use of the property
once the condemnor receives title to the property is just as problematic,
and perhaps more so, than the other problems previously discussed. If a
condemnor carries out a project on only a portion of the condemned land
and that project only marginally benefits the public, the condemnee is
still benefiting in some sense; the condemnee is part of the "public" and
therefore can benefit from the project to the same extent as the rest of the
community. However, if that project ceases, the only person who bene-
fits from the condemnation is the new property owner. Thus, the end
result would be as if the condemnation were for a private use, which the
Washington constitution explicitly prohibits and the U.S. Constitution
should prohibit.135 Despite this result, courts have upheld such rights for
condemnors under both constitutions.
36
A. The U.S. Supreme Court Supports
Condemnors' Right to Abandon the Public Use
In 1932, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed its commitment to pro-
tecting the rights of condemnors while limiting the rights of condemnees.
In Reichelderfer v. Quinn, Congress directed District Commissioners in
Washington D.C. to build a firehouse in place of an existing park.
37
135. See WASH. CONST. art. I, §16 (amended 1920); supra text accompanying notes 49-53.
136. There are a few cases from the 1800s and early 1900s that held that condemnees had a
reversionary interest if the condemnor failed to fulfill the public use. See, e.g., Hooker v. Utica &
Minden Tpk. Rd. Co., 12 Wend. 371 (1834); Gebhardt v. Reeves, 75 I1. 301 (1874); Abercrombie v.
Simmons, 71 Kan. 538, 81 P. 208 (1905). However, the majority of courts have held that the con-
demnee has no reversionary interest if such interest is not specified in the title or the applicable
statute. See, e.g., infra note 145 and accompanying text.
137. Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315, 317 (1932).
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People who owned lands that were next to the park brought suit against
the Commissioners, claiming that because the park land was originally
condemned and dedicated by the District to be used as a park, the District
violated the Fifth Amendment by abandoning that use. 38 The Court
rejected this argument, holding that because the District received title in
fee simple absolute when it originally condemned the land, the District
also had the right to put the property to a different use. 139 The fact that
the District had dedicated the property for use as a park did not affect the
Court's analysis; the Court noted that the dedication was nothing more
than a policy announcement that was not binding on future use deci-
sions. 40 Thus, although the District put the property to a new public use,
namely as a site for a firehouse, the Court did not rely on this fact in its
analysis. Instead, the Court focused on the District's right, as a holder of
a fee simple absolute title, to use the property as it deemed appropriate.
Therefore, it would seem to make little difference if the District used the
property as the site for a firehouse or sold it to a private owner.
B. The Washington Supreme Court Also
Supports Public Use Abandonment
The Washington Supreme Court has similarly allowed condemnors
to completely abandon the public use of the property without providing
any rights for condemnees to regain the property. In Reichling v. Coving-
ton Lumber Co., the city of Seattle condemned Reichling's property "for
the purposes of its Cedar river water system," thereby receiving fee sim-
ple title to Reichling's property. 14 1 After the condemnation, the city
granted a license to Covington Lumber Company (Covington) to build a
logging road over Reichling's former land.142 Reichling then brought suit
against Covington, claiming that if the city was not using the land for the
public use advanced at the condemnation proceedings, then he was the
rightful owner of the land. 143 The court rejected Reichling's claim, hold-
ing that because the city received the property in fee simple absolute, it
had the right to devote the property to any use it deemed appropriate.
144
The court stated, "Where a fee simple is taken, the weight of authority is
that there is no reversion, but, when the particular use ceases, the prop-
138. Id. at 317.
139. Id. at 318.
140. Id.
141.57 Wash. 225, 227, 106 P. 777, 777 (1910).
142. Id. at 227, 106 P. at 778.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 228, 106 P. at 778.
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erty may, by authority of the state, be disposed of for either public or
private use."
1 45
Although these cases were decided nearly eighty years ago and are
settled law, the issue is likely to come to the forefront again because of
the broad definition of public use under the U.S. Constitution, as well as
the expanding definition of public use under the Washington constitu-
tion. As Washington courts are more likely to approve exercises of emi-
nent domain today that would not have withstood the public use scrutiny
of earlier twentieth century courts, 14 6 property owners will have little
chance of preventing condemnors from condemning private property.
Therefore, the only way private property owners can protect themselves
from such takings is to challenge the taking collaterally. 147
Recently, the city of Seattle narrowly escaped litigation over public
use abandonment when voters voted against the Monorail Project (the
"Project") in November 2005.148 The city condemned a great deal of the
property needed for the Project before voters subsequently revoked the
city's authority to build the monorail. After voters rejected the monorail,
the city decided to sell the property it acquired in order to offset its ex-
penses. 149 Many property owners, including HTK, challenged the origi-
145. Id. (citing 2 JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 861 (596), at
1500 (3d ed. 1909); 3 JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS §1023 (589), at 1620 (5th ed. 1911)); see also Seattle Land & Improvement Co. v.
City of Seattle, 37 Wash. 274, 79 P. 780 (1905).
146. Compare Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 799, 825, 827, 341 P.2d 171, 186, 187
(1959), with State ex rel. Wash. State Convention & Trade Ctr. v. Evans, 136 Wash. 2d 811, 813,
815, 966 P.2d 1252, 1253-1254 (1998).
147. A condemnee collaterally challenges a taking when the condemnee brings a separate
action challenging the condemnation after the condemnation has occurred. See In re Peterson's
Estate, 12 Wash. 2d 686, 725-26, 123 P.2d 733, 751 (1942). This is in contrast to a direct challenge,
which occurs when the condemnee challenges the taking during the original condemnation proceed-
ings. See id
148. See Seattle Popular Monorail Authority, Seattle Monorail Project, Proposition 1 (Nov. 8,
2005), http://www.metrokc.gov/elections/contests/measureinfo.aspx?cid=17046&eid=1209. This
initiative was rejected by sixty five percent of voters. King County Election Results (Nov. 8, 2005),
http://www.metrokc.gov/elections/2005Nov/resPage20.htm.
149. See Larry Lange, Monorail Project Plans Quick Land Sale, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 18, 2006, at B4. See also Seattle Monorail Project, http://monorail
property.com (last visited Sept. 8, 2006) (listing all the property that was condemned for the Seattle
Monorail Project that was later sold to recoup losses incurred by the Project). For a listing of the
price Seattle Monorail Project (SMP) paid for various properties, as well as the price for which SMP
subsequently sold those properties, see Monorail Land Sell-Off SEATTLE TIMES, June 28, 2006,
available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/news/local/monorail/monorail28.html. SMP made
approximately eleven million dollars from selling property it acquired for the monorail. Mike Lind-
blom, Monorail Deals, Big and Small, SEATTLE TIMES, June 28, 2006, at A12. Although SMP did
lose money on a few properties, SMP was able to sell the majority of the properties for significantly
more than it paid for each property, selling one particular property for fifteen million dollars. Id.
This was sixty-six percent more than SMP paid for the property. Id.
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nal taking, 150 and it seemed likely that other property owners would chal-
lenge the city's ability to abandon the public use and sell the property to
a third party. However, three of the four property owners who challenged
the original takings were able to subsequently repurchase their property,
thereby avoiding litigation,' 51 although they did so at a much higher cost
than the original compensation for the taking. 152 For example, one family
had to pay $70,000 more to repurchase their property than SMP paid
them to condemn it.' 53 Even though SMP has so far managed to avoid
litigation on the issue of public use abandonment, given the plethora of
public projects and the increased use of eminent domain to effectuate
those projects, it is likely that public use abandonment will be litigated in
Washington in the near future.
Public use abandonment has not been litigated in Washington to
any great degree since Reichling, but courts in other jurisdictions have
addressed the issue in recent years.154 As the following discussion illus-
trates, this issue has not disappeared, and given the renewed interest in
condemnations due to the controversial Kelo decision,' 55 it is likely prop-
erty owners will bring similar cases both in Washington and in other
states.
IV. PUBLIC USE ABANDONMENT OUTSIDE OF WASHINGTON
All other state courts that have recently addressed public use aban-
donment have reached the same result: condemnors have the right to
abandon the public use of the property. 156 The basic rationale for uphold-
ing such rights for condemnors is that the condemnor received title to the
150. See HTK Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Seattle Popular Monorail Auth., 155 Wash. 2d 612, 630, 121
P.3d 1166, 1175 (2005).
151. Jennifer Langston, Balancing Payoff of Monorail Land Sell-Off, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, May 22, 2006, at AI. Cleve Stockmeyer, an SMP board member, stated in Decem-
ber 2005 that "he personally was sympathetic with property owners whose land was taken and their
'anguish at having their lives and businesses taken away for nothing, which is something we are not
allowed to compensate them for under state law."' Jeanne Language Jones, Loose End: Who Owns
'Sinking Ship'?, PUGET SOUND BUSINESS JOURNAL, Dec. 2, 2005, available at
http://seattle.bizjoumals.com/seattle/stories/2005/12/05/story4.html.
152. Jennifer Langston, Balancing Payoff of Monorail Land Sell-Off, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, May 22, 2006, at Al.
153. Mike Lindblom, Little Cafi to Survive Monorail Meltdown, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 21,
2006, at B1. In addition to the $70,000 price increase, the family estimates it had to pay an additional
$50,000 in attorney fees to compensate real estate experts used in fighting the condemnations. Id.
154. See infra Part IV.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 41-46.
156. See, e.g., Diaz v. City of Biloxi, 748 So. 2d 161, 163 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999); Indigo Realty
Co., Ltd. v. City of Charleston, 314 S.E.2d 601, 602 (S.C. 1984).
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property in fee simple absolute; 15 thus, the condemnor can do whatever
it wants with the property. Although this result is logical from the per-
spective of property law and the need for certainty in titles, 5 8 it has led
to vastly inequitable results from the perspective of the condemnee in
eminent domain proceedings. The following discussion illustrates the
need for substantive and procedural protections for condemnees to
prevent fraudulent and speculative takings.
One example of an inequitable result is Diaz v. City of Biloxi, where
the city of Biloxi condemned private property to effectuate its Biloxi
Waterfront Master Plan. 159 Ten years after the original taking, the former
property owners sued the city, claiming that it abandoned the plan, or,
alternatively, that the public use had been abandoned, and thus, the for-
mer property owners had a right of reversion. 160 The court affirmed
summary judgment in favor of the city, holding that the determination of
public use, and hence the validity of the taking and title, occurred at the
time of the original taking.' 61 Although the city may have subsequently
changed the use of the property, the court held that the taking was valid
because it occurred in good faith; thus, the former property owners had
no claim for reversion absent a specific reversionary interest in the
title. 162
This result is inequitable for a number of reasons. First, the court
was unable to examine whether the original taking was in fact valid.' 63 A
Mississippi statute required any challenge to an exercise of eminent do-
main to occur either within the original eminent domain proceeding 164 or
as an appeal within ten days of the original proceeding. 65 Because the
condemnees did not appeal the condemnation decision within ten days,
they waived any right to challenge the taking. 66 This is problematic
because the condemnees likely had no way of knowing within ten days
of the original condemnation whether or not the public use would occur.
157. See 28 AM. JUR. 2D Estates §13 (2000). A fee simple interest, also called fee simple abso-
lute, "represent[s] the entire and absolute interest and property in the land." Id This means that the
holder of the fee simple absolute interest is the only person who has legal title to the property. See id.
158. When it is unclear which party to a transaction has legal title to the property, many poten-
tial problems arise. The most obvious problem arises when one party tries to sell the property to a
third party; if one does not have legal title to property, then one obviously cannot sell that property.
Additionally, property owners may be hesitant to invest in or maintain property if they are uncertain
whether they can later sell the property.
159. Diaz, 748 So. 2d at 162.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 162-163.
162. See id. at 163-64.
163. Id. at 163.
164. Id. (citing MISS. CODE ANN. §11-27-15 (West 1999)).
165. Id. (citing MISS. CODE ANN. §11-27-29 (West 1999)).
166. Id.
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Allowing such a short period of time to appeal, coupled with the inability
to collaterally challenge the taking, leaves condemnees with little
protection from fraudulent and speculative takings.
Moreover, although the city of Biloxi may have in fact condemned
the property in good faith by planning to use it for a public purpose, it
was not required to present evidence proving good faith. Instead, the
court presumed the city was acting in good faith in the absence of
evidence proving otherwise. 67 This means the burden of proof was on
the condemnee to prove bad faith, which is difficult in the absence of a
"smoking gun" memo, or something similar, detailing bad faith.
In another case, a court upheld a taking after the condemnor aban-
doned the public use just six months after the condemnation. 161 In Indigo
Realty Company, Ltd. v. City of Charleston, the city of Charleston threat-
ened to condemn property owned by Indigo Realty Company (Indigo) in
order to widen a street.' 69 Indigo chose to voluntarily sell the property,
although the city admitted that had the company decided not to voluntar-
ily sell, the city would have initiated condemnation proceedings. 70 Six
months after the city acquired the property, it decided not to widen the
street due to financial problems.' 71 Indigo attempted to repurchase the
property for the original purchase price, but the city instead chose to sell
the land to a private developer who planned to use it for a private pur-
pose. 172 When Indigo sued the city to regain its property, the court held
that the validity of a taking must be judged at the time the title trans-
fers. 173 Because the original taking was for a public purpose, namely
widening a public road, the city had valid fee simple title to the property,
and Indigo had no claim to repurchase the land. 174 The court noted that if
the result in the case seemed unduly harsh, 175 the issue was for the legis-
lature, not the court, to rectify.
176
The inequity in Indigo Realty Company is striking. Indigo decided
to sell its land, believing it would be put to a use that would benefit the
public.' 77 Instead, a private developer ended up with title to the prop-
167. Id. at 164. "The proper question to be resolved by the trial court was . . . whether the
condemnation had been granted upon a good faith request for a public purpose. The Appellants have
not demonstrated that the condemnation was not predicated upon a good faith public purpose." Id.
168. Indigo Realty Co., Ltd. v. City of Charleston, 314 S.E.2d 601 (S.C. 1984).





174. See id. at 603.
175. Which seems to be a bit of an understatement!
176. Indigo Realty Co., Ltd. v. City of Charleston, 314 S.E.2d 601, 603 (S.C. 1984).
177. Id. at 602.
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erty. 178 Although the details of the sale price in either the original sale or
the subsequent sale to the developer are not discussed in the case, it is
safe to assume that had Indigo been able to negotiate directly with the
developer, the terms of the sale would have been different. Even if the
sale price was not different, it would have been Indigo, not the city, that
retained any increase in value of the property.
Although the results in Diaz and Indigo Realty Company are inequi-
table from the perspective of the condemnee, the inequities in the cases
are not identical. The amount of time between the taking and the aban-
donment of the public use is undoubtedly a significant difference
between Diaz and Indigo Realty Company. In Diaz, although the city
arguably abandoned the public use, the city did not do so until ten years
after the taking. 179 The city may have intended to continue the public use
indefinitely when it condemned the property, but due to changing cir-
cumstances, was unable to do so. However, it is difficult to argue in
Indigo Realty Company that the city had a good faith intention to use the
property for a public purpose and that the city managed its funds in good
faith. If the city had managed its funds in good faith, it seems unlikely
that its economic status could change so drastically in a six month period
that a recently approved project would become financially impossible
and not merely postponed.1 80 It seems more likely that the city never
intended to widen the street in the first place, or that the city recklessly
managed its funds, either of which amounts to bad faith. 81 However,
because the property owners were not able to produce evidence proving
bad faith, the city successfully defended itself.
These cases demonstrate, albeit in varying degrees, the necessity for
more procedural and substantive protections for private property owners
from arbitrary and harmful takings.
178. Id. at 603.
179. Diaz v. City of Biloxi, 748 So. 2d 161, 162 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).
180. Cf Indigo Realty Co., Ltd., 314 S.E.2d at 602.
181. Because courts presume condemnors act in good faith, see supra note 167 and accompa-
nying text, one can infer that good faith is an implicit requirement for the exercise of eminent do-
main. "Good faith" is defined as a "state of mind consisting of (1) honesty in belief or purpose, [or]
(2) faithfulness to one's duty or obligation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 713 (8th ed. 2004). If con-
demnors act in good faith when exercising eminent domain, they must necessarily manage their
funds in a responsible way; recklessness and good faith are logically incompatible. See id. at 1298
(defining "reckless" as "[c]haracterized by the creation of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm
to others and by a conscious (and sometimes deliberate) disregard for or indifference to that risk").
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V. A CALL FOR ADDITIONAL PROCEDURAL AND
SUBSTANTIVE PROTECTIONS FOR PROPERTY OWNERS
Allowing the condemnor to abandon the public use of the property
is problematic for at least two reasons. First, if the condemnor is allowed
to abandon the public use, there is no reason to require the condemnor to
show a prima facie public use in the first place; it serves as no protection
from fraudulent, speculative, or even worse, discriminatory takings.182
Theoretically, the reason the public use requirement exists is to protect
property rights. Whether from a Lockean or republican perspective under
the U.S. Constitution, or from the pro-property rights perspective of the
Washington constitution,' 83 private property rights can be sacrificed only
when the public benefits from the taking.1 84 But if the public does not
benefit, what justification remains for the exercise of eminent domain?
Neither the Fifth Amendment nor the eminent domain provisions of the
Washington constitution permit the exercise of eminent domain for pri-
vate purposes,' 85 so no justification for such takings should exist.'
86
It may be argued that in order to abandon the public use the con-
demnor must have necessarily put the property to a public use at some
time. After all, one cannot abandon something one has never done. Thus,
it could be argued that since the public benefited from some period of
public use, the public use requirement is satisfied. However, this argu-
ment misses the point. The public use requirement was not intended to be
182. See Kenneth R. Hamey, Domain Decision Weakens Homeowners' Position, SEATTLE
TIMES, July 2, 2005. Dana Berliner, an attorney from the Institute of Justice, the public-interest law
firm that represented the [plaintiffs in the Kelo casel, says only certain categories of people are at a
greater risk of being a victim of eminent domain abuse. id. These homeowners include residents in
older neighborhoods in desirable locations, such as near the waterfront, working and middle income
neighborhoods, and "[n]eighborhoods with high concentration of lower-income, minority residents."
Id.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 15-25. As previously discussed, although it is not
entirely clear what the Washington constitutional framers meant by terms such as public use, it is
clear that the framers intended to protect property rights from the government; the explicit prohibi-
tion of takings for private use evidences this intent. See WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16 (amended 1920).
184. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29; see also supra text accompanying notes 105-
08.
185. See U.S. CONST. amend V; supra text accompanying notes 2-3; WASH. CONST. art. I, §16
(amended 1920).
186. It may be argued that it is possible for the public to benefit from a taking even if the tak-
ing is for a private purpose. For example, a community could benefit from the increased tax income
resulting from a private retail development. However, this argument misses the mark. Neither the
U.S. nor Washington constitutions permit takings for private purposes that incidentally include a
public benefit; instead, both require that eminent domain be exercised only when the property will be
put to a public use. See U.S. CONST. amend V; WASH. CONST. art. 1, §16 (amended 1920). Although
public use has been interpreted broadly under both the federal and state constitution, the public char-
acter of the project remains a necessary component.
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an empty obligation. 187 Rather, it was intended to protect private property
rights from government interference, allowing condemnation only when
the property use would benefit the public.' 88 Allowing a condemnor to
take property for a public use that only lasts a matter of months, then sell
the property to private developers, does not protect private property
rights.
Moreover, the idea that condemnees receive "just compensation"
for their property and therefore should not have any claim if the public
use is abandoned'8 9 also misses the mark. Although condemnors are
always required to pay condemnees "just compensation" for the property
taken, 90 monetary compensation is not the only issue. As previously dis-
cussed, a home is more than a place that simply provides shelter: prop-
erty ownership, and more specifically home ownership, can define an
individual. 19' That an individual was theoretically compensated for los-
ing his or her property to a private developer does not justify the underly-
ing action. If condemnors exercise eminent domain, they should put the
property to a public use.' 92 In the absence of a public use, eminent
domain should not be involved; instead, free market negotiation should
dictate the terms of any property transfer.
Second, and most importantly for Washington residents, it is logi-
cally incompatible with Washington eminent domain jurisprudence to
allow condemnors to abandon the public use. In Hogue, the Washington
Supreme Court struck down an exercise of eminent domain in part
because the purpose of the taking was to transfer some of the property to
private corporations that would develop or operate industrial sites.'93 The
court held that this purpose violated the public use requirement, as the
Washington constitution specifically prohibits takings for private uses.
194
If this exercise of eminent domain, where not all of the parcels would be
sold to private developers, does violate the public use requirement, then
187. See supra text accompanying notes 15-25; supra text accompanying notes 72-73 and 77.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 15-25; supra text accompanying notes 72-73 and 77.
189. See, e.g., Reichling v. Covington Lumber Co., 57 Wash. 225, 228, 106 P. 777, 778 (1910)
(When [the city] paid the sum fixed as its value and respondent received such sum, all the
constitutional requirements had been complied with, and the title fully vested in the city
according to the terms of the decree. This being so, it follows that there was, and could
be, no reversion of right or interest in respondent to the lands, whether the city used the
lands for the purpose indicated in the petition or not.).
190. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 16 (amended 1920).
191. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32. Additionally, the notion that real property is
unique and therefore deserving of special protection is buttressed by the fact that courts usually grant
specific performance as a remedy for breach of contracts involving the sale of real property. See,
e.g., Tombari v. Griepp, 55 Wash. 2d 771, 775-76, 350 P.2d 452, 454-55 (1960).
192. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 16 (amended 1920).
193. Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 799, 825, 827, 341 P.2d 171, 186-187 (1959).
194. Id. at 827, 341 P.2d at 187.
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allowing a condemnor to abandon the public use should also violate the
Washington constitution. In both of these situations, at least one of the
primary beneficiaries of the taking is a private party not involved in the
original condemnation. This private party can put the property to a use
that will not benefit the public at all. Thus, both situations end up with
the same result, and the method used to transfer the property from the
condemnor to a private beneficiary should not validate an otherwise
impermissible taking.
A. Courts Should Not Presume Condemnors Act in Good Faith
or that the Requested Property and Interest are Necessary
To protect condemnees' rights to the same extent as condemnors'
rights, courts should play a more active role in condemnation proceed-
ings. For the property owner, absent a "smoking gun" memo detailing
the condemnor's plan to use eminent domain for inappropriate and illegal
private purposes, non-Washington courts presume condemnors act in
good faith, leaving the property owner with no protection from arbitrary
and unjust takings.195 One can infer that Washington courts would also
presume condemnors act in good faith when exercising eminent domain.
For example, although Washington courts make the initial determination
of whether a use is a public use, courts will defer to legislative determi-
nations concerning how much property is needed and what type of
interest is needed. 96 Thus, Washington courts already give a consider-
able amount of deference to legislative attempts to exercise eminent
domain; therefore courts would also likely presume condemnors act in
good faith.
However, courts should not presume that condemnors act in good
faith when attempting to exercise eminent domain. Given the increased
value of real estate in many areas197 and the increasing use of eminent
domain for improper purposes throughout the nation,' 98 presuming that
condemnors act in good faith puts private property rights at risk. Under
these conditions, condemnors can make a great deal of money by selling
property acquired through eminent domain. 99 As a result, condemnors
should now be required to prove they are acting in good faith when
bringing condemnation proceedings. Given that condemnors must make
195. See supra Part IV.
196. See supra Part lI.D.
197. For example, houses in Washington state appreciated 18.42% in 2005. U.S. Home Prices
Continue to Climb, Federal Agency Says, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 2, 2006, at E2. Thus, ifa condemnor
simply held title to property for one calendar year, he or she could make nearly twenty percent
profit, and perhaps more, depending on the neighborhood. See id.
198. See supra Part IV.
199. See supra note 197.
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an affirmative showing of public use, 2°° requiring condemnors to prove
they are acting in good faith will not be overly burdensome during
litigation.
A condemnor could prove it was acting in good faith by providing
detailed plans for the proposed project and proof that the condemnor has
the economic ability to complete the project. This evidence would tend to
prove the condemnor is acting in good faith because it is not easily fabri-
cated. Thus, if a condemnor goes to the trouble of producing detailed
plans and financial statments, it would serve as sufficient proof of good
faith in bringing the condemnation proceeding. Admittedly, requiring
condemnors to provide evidence of good faith will by no means prevent
all fraudulent or speculative takings. For example, if a condemnor
believes it can make a substantial amount of money from selling con-
demned property, and it has the economic ability to complete the pro-
posed public project, the condemnor could convince the court it is acting
in good faith when in fact it has no intention of ever completing the pub-
lic project. However, providing this first layer of protection is a step in
the right direction to providing much needed protection for condemnees.
Because requiring proof of good faith will not deter all fraudulent
or speculative takings, courts should also determine whether the property
is necessary for the project and whether the type of interest sought is
necessary for the project. Currently, Washington courts defer to legisla-
tive determinations of necessity, both in terms of the amount of property
sought and the interest needed to effectuate the project. Those legislative
determinations are considered conclusive in the absence of proof of
fraud. 20 However, if courts required the condemnor to prove that all of
the property at issue is necessary for the public use and that the interest
sought (usually fee simple absolute) is necessary, property owners would
receive an additional layer of protection from fraudulent and speculative
takings.
20 2
Even though requiring proof of necessity would not prevent all
fraudulent and speculative takings, it would undoubtedly deter some as
condemnors would bear the burden of producing evidence of why the
property is necessary and why a fee simple interest is necessary.
Currently, condemnors can rely on basic plans during condemnation
200. See, e.g., HTK Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Seattle Popular Monorail Auth., 155 Wash. 2d 612, 629,
121 P.3d 1166, 1174 (2005) (citing State ex rel. Wash. State Convention & Trade Ctr. v. Evans, 136
Wash. 2d 811, 817, 966 P.2d 1252, 1255 (1998) ("For a proposed condemnation to be lawful, the
condemning authority must prove that (1) the use is really public, (2) the public interest requires it,
and (3) the property appropriated is necessary for that purpose.") (emphasis added)).
201. See supra Part II.D.
202. See HTK Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Seattle Popular Monorail Auth., 155 Wash. 2d 612, 657-58,
121 P.3d 1166, 1190 (2005) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
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proceedings, but requiring proof would assure that condemnors had
thoroughly considered all options before bringing condemnation
proceedings.
If these two protections were available for the property owner in the
hypothetical introduced at the beginning of this Comment,20 3 the property
owner may not have lost his or her property. By not presuming the power
company was acting in good faith, the court would have required the
power company to bear the burden of producing evidence that it actually
planned to build the power plant. Since the power company abandoned
the project six months after condemning the property, it may not have
condemned the property in good faith, and thus, this procedural protec-
tion could have saved the property owner from unnecessarily
losing his or her home. Additionally, by requiring the power company to
prove that all the land at issue was necessary, and that a fee simple abso-
lute interest was necessary, the court would have provided further protec-
tion for the homeowner. Although there is no indication in the above
hypothetical that anything less than a fee simple interest in the full parcel
would suffice to complete the project, requiring the condemnor to prove
such facts is an appropriate balance between efficient condemnation pro-
ceedings and private property protection.
B. Condemnors Should Use the Property for a Public Use Within
a Reasonable Period of Time and for a Specified Period of Time
In addition to requiring the condemnor to bear the burden of pro-
ducing evidence of good faith, as discussed above, two additional
requirements should be imposed on condemnors as a condition of
exercising eminent domain.
First, condemnors should be required to use the property for a pub-
lic use within a reasonable period of time.20 4 "Reasonableness," an inher-
203. See supra Part I.
204. In Kelo v. City of New London, the Petitioners argued that the Court should adopt this
very standard when determining whether the government should be allowed to exercise eminent
domain. Brief of Petitioners at 36, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 125 S.Ct. 2655
(2005) (No. 04-108). However, the Court rejected this standard, reasoning that such a standard
would be too great a departure from precedent. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 125
S.Ct. 2655, 2668 (2005). The Court stated,
Orderly implementation of a comprehensive redevelopment plan obviously requires that
the legal rights of all interested parties be established before new construction can be
commenced. A constitutional rule that required postponement of the judicial approval of
every condemnation until the likelihood of success of the plan had been assured would
unquestionably impose a significant impediment to the successful consummation of many
such plans.
Id. at 2668. However, many people, including the Petitioners in Kelo, claim that courts should pre-
vent condemnations unless the overall plan is likely to succeed. See Brief of Petitioners at 36, Kelo
v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108) (2005); see also, e.g., Brief for Professors David
2007]
Seattle University Law Review
ently malleable standard, does not provide a concrete timeframe for
condemnors. However, it is the appropriate approach in order to balance
both the legitimate exercises of eminent domain that benefit the public
with the interests of private property owners in ensuring their property is
not taken for fraudulent or speculative uses. In fact, reasonableness is
already the standard for a number of eminent domain matters in Wash-
ington. For example, if a condemnor condemns more land than is imme-
diately necessarily to fulfill its project, yet intends to put the remaining
land to a public use within a reasonable period of time, the condemna-
tion is still valid.2 °5 Similarly, a condemnor is not required to produce
detailed plans for the public use in order to satisfy the public use
requirement.20 6 Instead, it is only required that the condemnor show the
property is reasonably necessary to effectuate the public use and that the
public use will occur within a reasonable period of time.20 7 Thus, adding
a requirement that the public use must actually occur within a reasonable
period of time is generally consistent with Washington eminent domain
jurisprudence.
Second, the condemnor should be required to use the property for
the public use for a period of time that would be specified in a statute.
During the Washington legislature's 2006 Regular Session, several bills
were presented that would require exactly this, but none passed.20 8
Although it is difficult to say exactly what period of time would be suffi-
cient to protect the rights of both condemnees and condemnors, a period
of at least five years but no more than twenty years is an appropriate
L. Callies et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 25, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S.
469 (2005) (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2803192 (stating that a preferred standard for eminent domain
would require the condemnor to prove that its need for the land was "not purely speculative, that the
proposed use of the land [was] reasonably certain to come to pass."). Moreover, although the Court
declined to implement this standard, see Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668, the Court did not say such a stan-
dard was unconstitutional. Thus, legislatures are free to create such additional protections for
property owners.
205. State ex rel. Union Trust & Sav. Bank v. Super. Ct. for Spokane County, 84 Wash. 20, 24,
145 P. 999, 1000 (1915), afd, 84 Wash. 20, 149 P. 324 (1915).
206. Hove v. Port of Seattle, 80 Wash. 2d 392, 398, 495 P.2d 327, 332 (1972) (citing Tacoma
v. Welcker, 65 Wash. 2d 677, 684, 399 P.2d 330, 335 (1965)).
207. Id. at 398, 495 P.2d at 332.
208. See H.B. 3017, 59th Leg., 2006 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006) (giving the condemnee the right
to repurchase the property if, within seven years of the condemnation, the property acquired for a
public purpose is no longer needed and should be sold); H.J. Res. 4217, 59th Leg., 2006 Reg. Sess.
(Wash. 2006) (giving the condemnee the right to void the condemnation and regain title to the prop-
erty if the property is put to a use different than that for which it was originally condemned, has not
been substantially put to the stated public use within ten years of the condemnation, or the stated
public use has been abandoned for ten years). Another related bill gives a condemnee the right to
collect damages in the amount of at least 135% of the fair market value of the property if it is sold by
the condemnor to a third party within five years of the condemnation. H.B. 2855, 59th Leg., 2006
Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006). However, none of these bills passed in either the House or the Senate.
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range. Five years is enough time for the condemnor to substantially begin
the project; if the project is not substantially started within this period, it
seems unlikely it will occur. In this situation, the condemnee should have
the option of regaining title to the property. Similarly, requiring that the
public use occur for no more than twenty years protects both condemnors
and condemnees. Condemnors are not faced with either using the prop-
erty for a public use in perpetuity or losing the property. Condemnees are
protected because condemnors will not exercise eminent domain unless
they know the property will be used for a public purpose for a substantial
amount of time. If the condemnors fail to fulfill their obligation, the
condemnee should have the right to regain title.
Another possible solution to fraudulent and speculative takings is to
require that all land taken through eminent domain include restrictions in
the title allowing the property to be used only for the stated public use.
This could be accomplished through the use of a fee simple determin-
209 210able2 °9 or fee simple subject to a condition subsequent. If the title con-
tains such restrictions, then the condemnor cannot subsequently sell the
property to someone who will use the property for private purposes, as
the restrictions in the title remain even if the property is sold.211
Therefore, such title restriction could eliminate the possibility of
fraudulent or speculative takings.
However, this solution could potentially create more problems than
it solves. There are legitimate reasons why a condemnor might abandon
the public use of the property that the condemnor cannot anticipate at the
time of the condemnation proceedings. For example, recall HTK Man-
agement, L.L.C. v. Seattle Popular Monorail Authority, discussed above.
209. A fee simple determinable is a fee simple estate that automatically terminates on the hap-
pening of a stated event, with title to the property returning to the original property owner. 28 AM.
JUR. 2D. Estates § 26 (2000). For example, in an action for eminent domain, the condemnor would
receive a fee simple determinable, with the condemnee automatically regaining title to the property
if the "stated event," which in this case would likely be a termination of the public use, occurs.
210. "An estate in fee simple subject to a condition subsequent is created by any limitation
which, in an otherwise effective conveyance of land, (a) creates an estate in fee simple; and (b) pro-
vides that upon the occurrence of a stated event the conveyor or his successor in interest shall have
the power to terminate the estate so created." Donald v. City of Vancouver, 43 Wash. App. 880,
884, 719 P.2d 966, 968 (1986) (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY §45 (1936)). For exam-
ple, in an action for eminent domain, instead of the condemnor receiving title in fee simple absolute,
the condemnor would receive title in fee simple subject to the condition that the property is used for
a public use. If the condition subsequent occurs, title does not automatically revert to the conveyor;
instead, the conveyor must affirmatively assert his claim to the property. Halvorsen v. Pacific
County, 22 Wash. 2d 532, 156 P.2d 907 (1945); Lewiston Water & Power Co. v. Brown, 42 Wash.
555, 85 P. 47 (1906); Metro. Park Dist. of Tacoma v. Rigney's Unknown Heirs, 65 Wash. 2d 788,
790, 399 P.2d 516, 517 (1965) (citing Mouat v. Seattle, Lake Shore & E. Ry. Co., 16 Wash. 84, 47
P. 233 (1896); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 57 (1936)).
211. 28 AM. JUR. 2D. Estates § 30 (2000).
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When the Seattle Monorail Project condemned property for the monorail,
it had no way of knowing that voters would subsequently repeal the
Monorail Project entirely.2t 2 If the land was restricted for use only as a
monorail, the city would have no choice but to return the land to the
original owners, or else try to seek a release from the condition.
Although some property owners, such as HTK, would have happily re-
gained title to the property, many businesses had already reestablished
themselves in new locations.21 3 Thus, not only would these owners not
need the property, but returning title to them may be extremely costly
and complicated. The property owners would have to return the compen-
sation they received for the original taking in order to regain title,
214
which may be difficult if they already spent the money on new property.
So although using defeasible estates could prevent some fraudulent and
speculative takings, it would likely harm property owners more than it
would help. Moreover, if the exercise of eminent domain becomes too
costly in terms of time and money, cities and other condemnors are likely
to abandon such proceedings altogether. This means that if the would-be
condemnor is not able to negotiate for the sale of the property directly
with the property owner, many beneficial public projects may not occur.
Thus, the combination of these four requirements would provide
much-need protections for private property owners: (1) courts not pre-
suming condemnors bring condemnation proceedings in good faith;
(2) courts making an independent determination of whether the property
at issue is necessary for the public project, as well as whether the re-
quested interest is necessary; (3) condemnors using the property for a
public use within a reasonable period of time; and (4) condemnors using
the property for a public use for a statutorily specified period. To ensure
complete protection, the legislature should provide condemnees with one
additional right if the condemnor fails to satisfy his or her statutory
obligations: the right to repurchase the property.
212. See supra note 148.
213. KING 5 News Up Front with Robert Mak: Monorail: Now What?, (KING 5 television
broadcast Nov. 13, 2005), transcript available at http://www.king5.com/upfront/showSupplement.
jsp?fldid=300.
214. Arguably, the property owner does not have to return the compensation originally re-
ceived for the property, as allowing the condenmee to keep the money serves as an additional deter-
rent for condemnors who might otherwise abandon the public use. See Kevin L. Cooney, Note, A
Profit for the Taking: Sale of Condemned Property After Abandonment of the Proposed Public Use,
74 WASH. U. L.Q. 75 , 772 (1996).
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C. Condemnees Should Have the Right to Repurchase the Property
if the Condemnor Fails to Fulfill the Statutory Obligations
If the condemnor fails to put the property to a public use within a
"reasonable" period of time,2 15 or fails to use the property for a public
use for the required statutory period, condemnees should have the right
to repurchase the property. The best option is to allow the condemnee to
repurchase the property at the original condemnation price. Another,
albeit less desirable, option is to allow the condemnee to repurchase the
property at the current market value.
1. Repurchase at Condemnation Price
The best option is to allow the condemnee to repurchase the prop-
erty at the condemnation price, which would require the legislature to
216enact a statute providing such right of repurchase. This option is equi-
table from the condemnee's perspective, as the condemnee is essentially
able to "undo" the taking by giving back the money and regaining title to
the property.2 17 In giving the condemnee such a right, the legislature
simultaneously deters condemnors from engaging in speculative takings.
Condemnors cannot benefit financially from a taking by selling the prop-
erty to the highest bidder or benefit from any market appreciation if they
chose not to put the property to a public use, as the condemnee will have
the first right to regain title.
215. By nature, the period of time that is reasonable will vary from one context to the next. For
example, if a condemnor claims during the condemnation proceedings that construction will begin
on the project within a year, if more than a year has passed, it may be more than a reasonable period
of time. Conversely, if a condemnor condemns property and admits construction will not begin for
two to three years, then the previous owner would arguably have to wait until three years has passed
before bringing a suit challenging the reasonableness of the period that has lapsed with no corre-
sponding public use.
216. See Cooney, supra note 214, at 768-69. Kentucky currently has this type of statute in
force. The statute states,
Development shall be started on any property which has been acquired through condem-
nation within a period of eight (8) years from the date of the deed to the condemnor or the
date on which the condemnor took possession, whichever is earlier, for the purpose for
which it was condemned. The failure of the condemnor to so begin development shall en-
title the current landowner to repurchase the property at the price the condemnor paid to
the landowner for the property. The current owner of the land from which the condemned
land was taken may reacquire the land as aforementioned.
Id.; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.670(1) (LexisNexis 2005).
217. Cooney, supra note 214, at 768.
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2. Repurchase at Current Market Value
A second option is to allow property owners to purchase the prop-
erty at the current market value.21 8 Although this type of statute is better
than providing no rights at all to the condemnee, as Washington currently
does, this approach has severe shortcomings. For example, if the prop-
erty value has increased at all, the previous owner may be economically
unable to repurchase the property.21 9 Moreover, this approach allows the
condemnor to benefit from the taking, even if the condemnor must trans-
fer title back to the condemnee; if they are allowed to retain the
difference between the original condemnation price and the subsequent
sale price, condemnors will still have an incentive to engage in fraudu-
lent and speculative takings. 220 Thus, even though this option is better
than providing no rights at all for the condemnee to collaterally attack the
condemnation, this option is inferior to the right of the condemnee to
repurchase the property at the original condemnation price.
VI. CONCLUSION
The public use requirement is an integral part of takings jurispru-
dence under both the Fifth Amendment and article I, § 16 of the
Washington constitution. The public use requirement should serve as a
protection for property owners against arbitrary and speculative govern-
mental interference with property rights. However, courts have expanded
public use beyond its original meaning, thereby providing less protection
than should be provided to property owners. Additionally, Washington
courts defer to legislative determinations as to the amount of property
necessary to complete a project, as well as the interest necessary. This
deference creates an additional barrier for property owners in protecting
their homes from condemnors.
As if these issues were not enough, private property rights are also
at risk when condemnors exercise eminent domain only to abandon the
public use of the property after condemnation, or worse, fail to ever ful-
fill a public use at all. Allowing condemnors to abandon the public use of
the property without providing corresponding rights to condemnees to
protect themselves is inconsistent with the public use requirement, as it
essentially leads to takings for private purposes. The public use require-
218. Cooney, supra note 214, at 766. Montana currently has this kind of statute in force. The
statute states in part, "[W]henever a person who has acquired a real property interest for a public use,
whether by right of eminent domain or otherwise, abandons the public use and places the property
interest for sale, the seller may sell the interest to the highest bidder at public auction." MONT. CODE
ANN. § 70-30-321(I) (2005).
219. See Cooney, supra note 214, at 768.
220. See Cooney, supra note 214, at 751, 768.
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ment is an integral part of both the U.S. and Washington constitutions'
eminent domain sections, and courts have too greatly expanded the reach
of those sections without giving condemnees any way to protect
themselves and their property.
To solve the inequity that results from the condemnor's public use
abandonment, a number of changes should occur. First, courts should
stop presuming that condemnors act in good faith in bringing condemna-
tion proceedings. Given the number of cases in which condemnors aban-
doned the public use, such a presumption is no longer warranted.
Second, courts should make the determination of which property
and what type of interest is necessary to complete a project, rather than
deferring to legislative pronouncements. Washington courts should
independently determine whether a project constitutes a public use and
also require proof of necessity from the condemnor.
Third, condenors should be required to use the condemned prop-
erty for a public use within a reasonable period of time and for a speci-
fied period. Imposing a time limit prevents the condemnor from delaying
use of the property until it appreciates so that it may sell the property to
the highest bidder. Eliminating this ability ensures that condemnors only
condemn property that is really needed for public projects. Similarly,
condemnors should also be required to use the property for a public use
for a specified period. This period could range anywhere from five to
twenty years. This would prevents condemnors from engaging in specu-
lative takings, as the condemnor is forced to put the property to a public
use.
If the condemnor fails to satisfy any of these conditions, the con-
demnee should have the right to repurchase the property at the original
condemnation price. This allows the condemnee to "undo" the taking by
regaining title and returning any compensation received for the property.
By giving condemnees this right, the legislature levels the playing field
between condemnors and condemnees. Condemnors have an incentive to
exercise eminent domain only when the property is actually needed for a
public project, and if the project does not occur, the condemnor may lose
the property. Similarly, condemnees have the ability to protect them-
selves from fraudulent or speculative takings by having the right to
regain title, if they choose to do so, if the public use is abandoned.
Today's courts are more likely to approve of exercises of eminent
domain that would not have withstood the scrutiny of early twentieth
century courts. It is therefore imperative that courts, as well as the legis-
lature, ensure that private property owners are protected from condem-
nors who take advantage of their power and use eminent domain for
improper and unfair purposes. Eminent domain is an inherent power of
2007]
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government, but government must do what it can to ensure that private
property rights are secure.
